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When data protection by design and
data subject rights clash
Michael Veale*, Reuben Binns** and Jef Ausloos***
Introduction
Data protection law has historically faced significant en-
forcement challenges. Data protection authorities
(DPAs) have classically been underfunded and out-
gunned, possessing limited ability to scrutinize the on-
the-ground practices of data controllers and restricted
capacity to meaningfully act when transgressions are
suspected. In response to these governance challenges,
concerned communities have advocated a range of tech-
nological approaches that allow effective but non-
invasive use of data, or ‘DIY’ protections which data
subjects can adopt unilaterally.1
These approaches, often called ‘privacy-enhancing
technologies’ (PETs), are commonly discussed in regu-
latory circles within the context of ‘privacy by design’
(PbD). PbD emphasizes that issues of privacy should be
considered from the start and throughout the design
process through creative social and technical means.
Most point to its intellectual home in a report under-
taken by the Dutch Data Protection Authority and
TNO, with support of the then Information and Privacy
Commissioner for Ontario, Tom Wright,2 although its
heritage can be traced further back to the considerations
given to ‘technical and organizational measures’ in the
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data protection directive (DPD)3 and in the national
and regional laws that preceded it.4 The term PbD en-
tered use around 2000, with the Workshop on Freedom
and Privacy by Design at the Computers, Freedom and
Privacy 2000 conference in Toronto,5 and a variety of
papers made use of the term around that time.6 As laid
out by the Information and Privacy Commissioner for
Ontario from 1998–2014, Ann Cavoukian, PbD is not
simply a set of organizational and technical measures to
prevent information disclosure, but maps more broadly
onto a wider idea of privacy as represented by the Fair
Information Practices (FIPs) and even extends beyond
them, aiming at a ‘significant “raising” of the bar in the
area of privacy protection’.7
While recommendations of PbD by regulators have
significant history,8 the concept has only recently made
it onto the statute books in Europe as part of the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).9 In doing
so, it underwent a shrewd transformation into ‘data
protection by design’ (DPbD). This metamorphosis,
which some scholars have commented on as wise,10
makes it clear that the aim is to ensure privacy as
enshrined in data protection rights and principles,
rather than the flexible, multi-layered and hard to pin
down concept of privacy in general.11 While the
European Commission has historically referred to the
two concepts synonymously,12 the focus on DPbD alone
provides scope for further clarity. Lee Bygrave summa-
rizes that DPbD requirements, as now enshrined in
Article 25 of the GDPR (and also in Article 20 of the
Law Enforcement DP Directive),13 impose a ‘qualified
duty on controllers to put in place technical and organi-
sational measures that are designed to implement data
protection principles effectively and to integrate neces-
sary safeguards into the processing of personal data so
that such processing will meet the Regulation’s require-
ments and otherwise ensure protection of data subjects’
rights’.14 The relevant article, Article 25 of the GDPR,
reads:
1. Taking into account the state of the art, the cost of
implementation and the nature, scope, context and
purposes of processing as well as the risks of varying
likelihood and severity for rights and freedoms of
natural persons posed by the processing, the con-
troller shall, both at the time of the determination of
the means for processing and at the time of the pro-
cessing itself, implement appropriate technical and
organisational measures, such as pseudonymization,
which are designed to implement data-protection
principles, such as data minimization, in an effective
manner and to integrate the necessary safeguards
into the processing in order to meet the require-
ments of this Regulation and protect the rights of
data subjects.
2. The controller shall implement appropriate technical
and organizational measures for ensuring that, by
default, only personal data which are necessary for
each specific purpose of the processing are pro-
cessed. That obligation applies to the amount of per-
sonal data collected, the extent of their processing,
the period of their storage and their accessibility. In
particular, such measures shall ensure that by default
personal data are not made accessible without the
individual’s intervention to an indefinite number of
natural persons.
3. An approved certification mechanism pursuant to
Article 42 may be used as an element to demonstrate
compliance with the requirements set out in para-
graphs 1 and 2 of this article.
3 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the process-
ing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ 1995 L
281/31 (Data Protection Directive, hereafter ‘DPD’).
4 See generally, Gloria Gonza´lez Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data
Protection as a Fundamental Right of the EU (Springer, Dordrecht 2014).
5 ‘Computers, Freedom and Privacy 2000: Full Program’ <http://www.
cfp2000.org/program/full-program.html#tuesday> accessed 19
November 2017.
6 See eg Julie E Cohen, ‘Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the
Subject as Object’ (2000) 52 Stanford Law Review 1373; Marc
Langheinrich, ‘Privacy by Design—Principles of Privacy-Aware
Ubiquitous Systems’ in Gregory D Abowd, Barry Brumitt and Steven
Shafer (eds), Ubicomp 2001: Ubiquitous Computing, vol 2201 (Springer,
Dordrecht 2001).
7 Ann Cavoukian, Privacy by Design: The 7 Foundational Principles
(Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Toronto, Canada
2010) 1.
8 van Rossum and others (n 2).
9 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation), OJ 2016 L 119/1 (hereafter ‘GDPR’).
10 See Mireille Hildebrandt and Laura Tielemans, ‘Data Protection by
Design and Technology Neutral Law’ (2013) 29 Computer Law &
Security Review 509, 517.
11 Kieron O’Hara, ‘The Seven Veils of Privacy’ (2016) 20 IEEE Internet
Computing 86.
12 Commission, ‘A Digital Agenda for Europe’ (Communication) COM
(2010) 0245 final.
13 EU Law Enforcement Directive: Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protec-
tion of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by
competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation,
detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal
penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, OJ 2016 L 119/89 (hereafter the
‘Law Enforcement DP Directive’).
14 Lee A Bygrave, ‘Data Protection by Design and by Default: Deciphering
the EU’s Legislative Requirements’ (2017) 1 Oslo Law Review 105, 114.
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What are these principles that technical and organiza-
tional measures should take aim at? They are found pri-
marily in Article 5(1): lawful, fair and transparent
processing; purpose limitation; data minimization; ac-
curacy; storage limitation; and integrity and confidenti-
ality. Article 5(2) introduces a further, additional
overarching principle to the GDPR, ‘accountability’,
laying the burden of proof on the controller to prove
compliance with the six principles in Article 5(1).
Yet, in contrast to these wide-ranging principles,
within which reside the rights and obligations the legis-
lation details, the PETs literature takes relatively single-
minded aim at information disclosure. It focusses in
particular on guarantees rooted in either information
theory or the computational “hardness” of the resultant
re-identification or disclosure problem.15 Despite at-
tempts in related literature on complementary
approaches to coin terms such as ‘transparency-enhanc-
ing technologies’ and ‘profile transparency by design’,
the PET paradigm has dominated the ‘by design’ discus-
sion in data protection contexts.16 Unlike the data pro-
tection paradigm, which has increasingly shifted to
placing accountability obligations upon data controllers
in an effort to make them trusted custodians of personal
data, the PET paradigm departs from a ‘diametrically
opposed perception’, not of the data controller as a
trusted third party, but as an adversary.17 In a similar
vein, recent taxonomies of privacy-enhancing technolo-
gies claiming to be ‘comprehensive’ consider privacy
primarily in terms of disclosure risks present at different
levels, rather than in terms of the multi-faceted nature
of privacy espoused by Cavoukian and the European
Commission.18
This notion of privacy-as-confidentiality sits at least
apart from, and potentially at tension with, the notion
of privacy-as-control as espoused by the FIPs and the
GDPR.19 As the Article 29 Working Party notes, PbD
incorporates rights such as erasure, noting that ‘func-
tionality should be included facilitating the data
subjects’ right to revoke consent, with subsequent data
erasure in all servers involved (including proxies and
mirroring).’ They note that in addition to data confi-
dentiality, ‘controllability’, ‘transparency’, ‘data minimi-
zation’, and ‘user friendly systems’ should be considered
under the PbD umbrella.20
Despite these clarifications by regulators, the re-
naming of the term to emphasize its focus, and the com-
mentary in the literature on the wide array of protection
goals that privacy engineering should have,21 ‘privacy by
design’ in practice is often a narrower affair. Where data
are of high dimensionality (where they have many dis-
tinct variables), many PbD approaches aimed at the
‘unlinkability’ of data22 will inevitably fail to prevent in-
formation disclosure where faced with a capable adver-
sary. This does not mean that PETs cannot be used to
minimize or reduce risk in this way, but we argue that
this minimization comes at a cost. That cost can be, as
we demonstrate with case studies, the effective ability to
wield data protection rights—the ‘intervenability’ pro-
moted by privacy-as-control—over such data.23 The im-
portant rights of access and portability (Articles 15, 20),
erasure (Articles 17), and the right to object to process-
ing (Article 21) suffer in particular as a result.
There is a danger that data controllers implement
privacy design strategies24 that leave them with data
that is difficult for them to re-identify, but far from triv-
ial for an adversary to, given that adversaries likely have
a high tolerance for inaccuracy and access to many addi-
tional, possibly illegal, databases to triangulate individ-
uals with. The situation is worsened by the fact that a
data controller may have relatively little technical re-
identification capacity, while also having a very low tol-
erance for inaccuracy when it comes to their provision
of core data protection rights, such as access or erasure.
Indeed, to erroneously provide a data subject sensitive
personal data of another in response to a subject access
request would usually be in breach of the same law the
controller would be seeking to comply with.
15 See generally, Casey Devet and Ian Goldberg, ‘The Best of Both Worlds:
Combining Information-Theoretic and Computational PIR for
Communication Efficiency’, Privacy Enhancing Technologies (Springer,
Cham 2014).
16 See eg Hildebrandt, Mireille, ‘Profile Transparency by Design?: Re-
Enabling Double Contingency’, in Privacy, Due Process and the
Computational Turn: The Philosophy of Law Meets the Philosophy of
Technology (Routledge, London 2013) 221–46 ; and Milena Janic, Jan
Pieter Wijbenga and Thijs Veuge, ‘Transparency Enhancing Tools
(TETs): an Overview’ (2013) Third Workshop on Socio-Technical Aspects
in Security and Trust (STAST), New Orleans, LA, USA, 29 June 2013.
17 Diaz and others (n 1).
18 Johannes Heurix and others, ‘A Taxonomy for Privacy Enhancing
Technologies’ (2015) 53 Computers & Security 1. Note that not all con-
ceptions of privacy engineering share these assumptions: cf Marit
Hansen, Meiko Jensen, and Martin Rost, ‘Protection Goals for Privacy
Engineering’ (2015) IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops.
19 Seda Gu¨rses, ‘Can You Engineer Privacy?’ (2014) 57 Communications of
the ACM 20.
20 Art 29 Working Party, Working Party on Police and Justice, ‘The Future
of Privacy: Joint Contribution to the Consultation of the European
Commission on the Legal Framework for the Fundamental Right to
Protection of Personal Data’ (WP 168, 1 December 2009) 14.
21 Hansen, Jensen and Rost (n 18).
22 Andreas Pfitzmann and Marit Ko¨hntopp, ‘Anonymity, Unobservability,
and Pseudonymity—A Proposal for Terminology’, in Designing Privacy
Enhancing Technologies (Springer, Dordrecht 2001).
23 On the varied goals of privacy engineering, see Hansen, Jensen and Rost
(n 18).
24 Jaap-Henk Hoepman, ‘Privacy Design Strategies’, ICT Systems Security
and Privacy Protection (Springer, Dordrecht 2014).
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These controllers, some of which we will illustrate be-
low in case studies, have bound their hands in a very
particular way. Their actions have reduced their own
data protection obligations and shifted a risk onto the
data subject, who has been stripped of her ability to
manage the risk herself. When the data subject con-
cerned loses trust in a previously trusted controller,
there is nothing she can do but wait for a breach and
hope that her record is unable to be effectively
triangulated.
We do not intend to suggest that this is a deliberate
tactic by the data controllers in our case studies (even
though it might be an effective one). However, it does
not need to be deliberate to be problematic. Trade-offs
are a natural part of all complex decision-making, and
the need to make them clearly rather than implicitly is a
core component of good decision-making in value-
laden contexts.25 Where there are very few organiza-
tional or technical measures supporting data protection
deployed, DPbD is likely to benefit everyone. But where
basic safeguards are already in place, satisfying everyone
and their varying privacy preferences26 may become
more difficult, as ‘privacy’ is no longer a case of Pareto-
improvement (under which it can masquerade as a uni-
fied concept), but requires choosing a certain approach
(eg confidentiality) to the detriment of others (eg con-
trol). Thinking in terms of data protection rights and
obligations as we do in this article can make this chal-
lenge clearer: achieving one makes it more difficult, or
even impossible, to achieve others. Not engaging with
these trade-offs does not make them disappear, it simply
means they have been determined in an arbitrary fash-
ion. In this article, we do however present some vi-
gnettes which indicate that certain controllers do pursue
an interpretation of these provisions, deliberately or
not, which is unfavourable to the effective exercise of
data subject rights.
Deliberate or not, these implicit trade-offs are not
even contemplated by pre-emptive provisions in data
protection law, such as data protection impact assess-
ments (DPIAs). We believe that there are indeed
grounds in the GDPR to support more consideration
and transparency regarding the way these trade-offs are
determined and communicates—and it is important we
identify and use them in this way—but it requires new
readings of many of the relevant obligations which this
article aims to provide. Firstly, however, we turn to
real-world case studies to explore this concern in
context.
Case studies of rights lost in the balance
WiFi analytics on the London Underground
Between 21 November and 19 December 2016,
Transport for London (TfL), the public transit agency
for the UK’s capital, ran an in-house trial using the
WiFi networks installed at 54 of the stations they man-
age. They collected more than 500 million connection
requests from devices passively transmitting their MAC
addresses, with the aim of improving (i) customer in-
formation for journey planning and congestion;
(ii) management of events and disruption; (iii) timeta-
ble planning and station upgrades; (iv) retail unit and
advertising positioning.27
Transport for London, unlike many undertaking
WiFi analytics,28 were aware of legal obligations in this
area, data protection in particular. TfL undertook a data
protection impact assessment (DPIA) and met with the
UK’s DPA, the Information Commissioner’s Office
(ICO).29 They cite the ICO’s WiFi Analytics Guidance30
in their use of salting MAC addresses to make re-
identification on the basis of device hardware data
highly challenging for an attacker. In consultation with
the ICO, users were informed using a ‘layered ap-
proach’, which included a press release picked up by the
media, a news story on 21 November in the Metro
(a free morning newspaper widely distributed and read
on London transport), a linked website (tfl.gov.uk/pri-
vacy) adapted throughout the trial on the basis of feed-
back with users, 300 large posters on platforms and at
station entrances, through social media and through
briefings packs issued to station staff and stakeholder
organizations.31
25 The ubiquity of trade-offs and the importance of making them explicitly
is a core component of public policy education. See eg Eugene Bardach,
A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective
Problem Solving (CQ Press, Washington DC 2011).
26 A Westin, Privacy on & off the internet: What consumers want (Privacy &
American Business, 2001); Mark S Ackerman, Lorrie Faith Cranor, and
Joseph Reagle, ‘Privacy in e-Commerce: Examining user Scenarios and
Privacy Preferences’, Proceedings of the 1st ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce, EC’99, New York, NY, USA (ACM, New York 1999).
27 Transport for London, ‘Insights from Wi-Fi Data: Proposed Pilot’
<https://perma.cc/6FZX-VHHK>; Transport for London, Review of the
TfL WiFi Pilot (Transport for London 2017) 6–8 <https://perma.cc/
97DG-KU35> accessed 24 October 2017.
28 See eg College bescherming persoonsgegevens, Wifi-Tracking van Mobiele
Apparaten in En Rond Winkels Door Bluetrace (Rapport z2014-00944)
(Autoriteit Persoongegevens 2015) <https://perma.cc/2JVA-9HYR>
accessed 20 September 2017.
29 Transport for London, Review of the TfL WiFi Pilot (n 27) 22.
30 Information Commissioner’s Office, Wi-Fi Location Analytics (ICO
2016).
31 See Transport for London, Review of the TfL WiFi Pilot (n 27) 22;
Transport for London, TfL WiFi Analytics Briefing Pack (Transport for
London 2016) <https://perma.cc/7PHN-WBGH> accessed 24 October
2017. Note that some NGOs felt that the posters displayed in and around
stations were insufficiently clear about how to opt-out. See Ed Johnson-
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As location data is high dimensional, it is highly
likely to be unique and easy to re-identify. A now classic
study showed that only four spatiotemporal points are
needed to single out the vast majority of individuals in a
dataset, even where records are rendered significantly
coarser (something that often heavily diminishes the
data’s utility).32 Unsurprisingly, TfL are therefore un-
comfortable with releasing the dataset, refusing it on
privacy grounds when requested under Freedom of
Information law. They note, correctly, that:
Although the MAC address data has been pseudonymised
[. . .] given the possibility that the pseudonymised data
could, if it was matched against other data sets, in certain
circumstances enable the identification of an individual, it
is personal data. The likelihood of this identification of an
individual occurring would be increased by a disclosure of
the data into the public domain, which would increase the
range of other data sets against which it could be
matched.33
Some concerns have been raised over the nature of the
‘salt’ added to the MAC address or other identifier to
generate the string to be hashed.34 While the ICO rec-
ommends that a salt be changed after ‘a short period of
time’,35 and the Article 29 Working Party recommends
that a unique device identifier should only be stored ‘for
a maximum period of 24 hours for operational pur-
poses’,36 it appears that TfL used a constant salt, gener-
ated by once typing letters at random on the keyboard
with averted eyes.37 Such an approach creates two risks.
Firstly, anyone who knew or discovered this salt could
reverse engineer the process. Secondly, and arguably
more probably, a constant salt links devices across days,
making attacks not aimed at cryptography but based on
external sources of data, such as knowing where some-
one was at four particular times in a week, more
feasible.
One approach would seek to make extra efforts to
de-identify the held data. The main way to make data
more difficult to re-identify would be to give records
more frequently-changing, difficult-to-reverse hashed
identifiers. But this would likely be unacceptable for
some controllers, as it makes the purpose of the analysis
they seek to undertake difficult to fulfil, and so data
subjects might suspect that data controllers would wish
to transform the data in this way. For example, it would
preclude the use of analysis to understand longitudinal
patterns in data, restricting them only to what can be
learned in a snapshot of time. This is far from the logic
of the A/B testing style trials favoured in both industry
and policy circles right now.38
Yet, another approach sits on the side of the data
subject, rather than the controller. More specifically, it
sits with capabilities and behaviours of the hardware
used. Much of data protection law aims to build trust in
data controllers as responsible stewards of sensitive in-
formation. Yet, proponents of personal PETs take what
some may consider as a contrasting, comparatively dis-
mal view of the world—a gloomy planet where every
other actor is a potential adversary that wants to do
harm to them with their data—and as such seek to
adopt technical practices in order to minimize the infor-
mation that any third party can learn about them. These
practices are increasingly popular with some software
and hardware producers. Apple’s portable devices in-
clude MAC address randomization, which seeks to foil
third parties working to build a longitudinal record of a
particular device’s network scanning activity. Some
Android devices utilize this, although many manufac-
turers, such as Samsung, do not support or practice it.39
This has a similar, although not identical,40 effect to reg-
ularly changing the salt, and serves to make persistent
tracking harder.
Williams, ‘TfL Needs to Give Passengers the Full Picture on WiFi
Collection Scheme’ (Open Rights Group, 25 November 2016) <https://
perma.cc/8YEA-BV8D> accessed 24 October 2017.
32 Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye and others, ‘Unique in the Crowd: The
Privacy Bounds of Human Mobility’ (2013) 3 Scientific Reports 1376.
33 Natasha Lomas, ‘How “anonymous” Wifi Data Can Still Be a Privacy
Risk’ (TechCrunch, 7 October 2017) <https://perma.cc/Y63T-MAC8>
accessed 24 October 2017.
34 A hash function is a one-way transformation of data. For example, the
md5 hash of ‘iheartdataprotection’ is ‘374d67ace049664f8837250bab
7010ed’. A salt is a string added to data before it is hashed. For example,
to add the salt ‘1’ would result in ‘iheartdataprotection1’, which has a dif-
ferent md5 hash (‘d6790618285a4f41c79aba2eb9bced3e’). There should
be reversible mathematical link between those two outputs; the only way
to reverse engineer is through ‘brute force’. Yet, as someone could (and
people do) make extremely large tables of all possible MAC addresses
and their resultant hashes, salts are crucial to avoid reversal of the hash
process.
35 Information Commissioner’s Office (n 30) 6.
36 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 13/2011 on Geolocation Services on
Smart Mobile Devices’ (WP 185, 16 May 2011), 19.
37 Lukasz Olejnik, ‘Privacy of London Tube Wifi Tracking’ (Security,
Privacy & Tech Inquiries [blog], 11 September 2017) <https://blog.lukas
zolejnik.com/privacy-of-london-tube-wifi-tracking/> accessed 24
October 2017; Lomas (n 33).
38 While snapshot analytics might help an organisation like TfL better un-
derstand overcrowding and crowd management, for example, it would
not, for example, allow them to easily understand something such as
whether individuals that often run down escalators that subsequently
stop by certain posters telling them not to indeed change their behaviour
in the future. Whether analytics tracking individuals over time should be
allowed is not a topic we weigh in on here, only noting that this is the
type of analytics prevalent in online industries today.
39 Jeremy Martin and others, ‘A Study of MAC Address Randomization in
Mobile Devices and When It Fails’ (2017) 2017 Proceedings on Privacy
Enhancing Technologies 802.
40 In particular, MAC randomization does not prevent attackers recovering
the several MAC addresses from unsalted or poorly salted hashes through
brute force.
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Yet, even with these approaches enabled, researchers
are consistently finding ways, both statistical and based
on technical implementation or other features of smart-
phones, to link individuals across contexts.41 As TfL rec-
ognize, despite protections placed at either the
controller side or the device side, such data is not safe
from re-identification attacks.
Given this risk of reidentification, particularly from
adversaries were data to leak, does a data subject not
have a right to understand the data that is being col-
lected about them, and utilize their rights, such as the
right to object to processing, or the right to erase data
relating to them? It is not difficult to imagine a situation
where a previously trusted data controller now loses
trust, either to be a well-intentioned custodian of data,
or to be capable of keeping it confidential with high cer-
tainty.42 While a data subject may well wish to do so,
these protections, whilst not fully mitigating any risk,
do effectively remove the ability of data controllers to
provide the full range of data protection rights usually
afforded to data subjects. Indeed, TfL note:
The salt is not known by any individual and was destroyed on
the day the data collection ended. Therefore, we consider the
data to be anonymous and are unable to identify any specific
device. As we cannot process known MAC addresses in the
same manner as we did in the pilot, we are unable to complete
any Subject Access Request for the data we collected.43
Were TfL to attempt this, they would find that in the
cases of some hardware, the difficulty would be com-
pounded by the device MAC randomization practices
described above. In particular, while devices can be
identified with acceptable levels of accuracy for an at-
tacker,44 the levels of identification achieved would be
insufficient for providing guaranteed and comprehen-
sive erasure, or accurate access (including avoiding di-
vulging information about others).45 This reduces the
protection afforded by law to the security provisions in
the GDPR, as well as the trust in the controller to adhere
to the principle of purpose limitation, giving the data
subject little-to-no control over the data observed about
them after the fact.
As mentioned, beyond subject access requests, an-
other provision in the GDPR relates to the right to ob-
ject to processing.46 Where the legitimate or public
interest grounds are relied upon, data subjects should
be ‘entitled to object to the processing of any personal
data’ unless the controller can ‘demonstrate that its
compelling legitimate interest overrides the interests or
the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data sub-
jects’.47 This manifests as an ‘opt-out’ provision, recom-
mended in relation to ‘big data’ analytics grounded in
legitimate interests by both the ICO and the European
Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS).48 Opt-outs from
Wi-Fi analytics in particular feature in the ICO’s guid-
ance on the matter,49 although whether they are manda-
tory under European law is unclear.50 This may yet
change in the proposed updated ePrivacy regulation (at
the time of writing entering trialogue negotiations),
which has been amended to require opt-outs when
WiFi analytics have been used.51 The Dutch Data
Protection authority stopped short of mandating WiFi
tracking firm Bluetrace to be required to offer opt-outs,
instead settling for the company to undertake research
41 Martin and others (n 39); Mathy Vanhoef and others, ‘Why MAC Address
Randomization is not Enough: an Analysis of Wi-Fi Network Discovery
Mechanisms’, Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer
and Communications Security (ASIACCS 2016) (ACM 2016).
42 It could be argued that as TfL already have potentially re-identifiable
gate-to-gate data on users travel behaviour collected by their Oyster
smart ticketing system, such erasure would often not do much to reduce
data on their behaviour from data controllers, unless individuals relied
on higher-cost disposable paper tickets. However, WiFi analytics would
provide re-identification capacity above this, and could even reveal addi-
tional information, such as adverts looked at, or which individuals were
travelling in proximity to each other.
43 Transport for London, Review of the TfL WiFi Pilot (n 27) 22.
44 One study found identification success ranged from around 20–50% in
the presence of MAC randomization, becoming more difficult with more
individuals present, and increased time of tracking demanded. See
Vanhoef and others (n 41).
45 On the risks of subject access requests creating privacy breaches, see
Andrew Cormack, ‘Is the Subject Access Right Now Too Great a Threat
to Privacy’ (2016) 2 European Data Protection Law Review 15. For fur-
ther discussion on subject access rights and re-identification see below in
section ‘Case studies of rights lost in the balance’. Acquiring additional
information (arts 11; 12(2) and Recital 57, GDPR)’.
46 Art 21(1), GDPR.
47 Recital 69, GDPR. A similar argument can be made in relation to the
public interest ground for processing.
48 Information Commissioner’s Office, Big Data, Artificial Intelligence,
Machine Learning and Data Protection (ICO 2017) para 69; European
Data Protection Supervisor, Meeting the Challenges of Big Data, Opinion
7/2015 (EDPS 2015).
49 Information Commissioner’s Office (n 30).
50 BFE Bosch and NANM van Eijk, ‘Wifi-Tracking in de Winkel(straat):
Inbreuk Op de Privacy?’ (2016) 19 Privacy & Informatie 245.
51 Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Report on the
proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council concerning the respect for private life and the protection of
personal data in electronic communications and repealing Directive
2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications),
European Parliament, 2017. See also the original proposal, containing
weaker provisions around wireless analytics: Proposal for a Regulation
of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the respect
for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic com-
munications and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on
Privacy and Electronic Communications), COM(2017) 10 final, 10
January 2017.
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into their technical feasibility, and pointing them to-
wards opt-out registers being developed by Dutch civil
society organizations.52 To the authors’ knowledge, the
company never did so, having instead opted to cease
WiFi analytics entirely, its business model being incom-
patible with the requirements of the regulator.53
In addition, the ‘Mobile Location Analytics Code of
Conduct’ proposed by the Future of Privacy Forum
(FPF) has opting-out as one of its principles, noting
that the option should be available on the website of an
operator.54 Indeed, FPF themselves run an opt-out ser-
vice which partners with some organisations selling Wi-
Fi tracking technologies to provide a global opt-out list
(https://optout.smart-places.org/). FPF note on their
website, however, that
Owners of iOS 8 devices that wish to opt-out of Mobile
Location Analytics can still do so by visiting the Smart
Store Privacy Opt Out Page. However, since this opt out
works by recognizing the MAC address of an opted-out de-
vice, in the case of iOS 8 devices, any such opt out will be
reset when the device’s MAC address changes.55
This highlights another rights issue—that the Privacy by
Design approach taken in the development of Apple de-
vices, among others56 prevents effective opting out with-
out necessarily providing effective privacy. The ambient
environment, much of which is rightfully untrusted, as
anybody could silently set up a device capturing MAC
addresses, leads hardware providers to make a value
choice for data subjects. Whether opting out is possible
given MAC randomization is a research question in and
of itself. Legally, enforceable Do Not Track signals may
be required—something which raise many issue in and
of themselves that we do not seek to unpack in this arti-
cle, suffice to say that they would require unprecedented
coordination between the manufacturers of wireless
tracking systems and those of mobile devices.57
Apple’s ‘Siri’ voice assistant
Voice assistants are commonplace in a range of devices.
Typically, these systems, including Microsoft’s Cortana,
Google’s Assistant and Apple’s Siri, work by recording
and compressing audio data, processing it for transcrip-
tion on the company’s servers, and returning the tran-
script to the phone, where a local speech synthesis
system may ‘reply’ to the user. The use of this approach
has allowed unprecedented accuracy in speech recogni-
tion, as well as avoiding energy, resource and
space–intensive processing on the terminal device.
Many people use these technologies to activate device
functionalities, or to dictate messages or documents.
Firms may provide the recording data to data sub-
jects. Google, for example, provide a tool where voice
and audio data can be searched and managed.58 These
can be seen as meeting their access obligations under
European data protection law, although unlike many
implementations of access rights, there does not appear
to be a difference in these tools inside or outside the
USA.
Other firms, notably Apple, despite providing a near-
identical service to their competitors in this regard, do
not provide these data to data subjects automatically,
nor do they provide such data upon explicit request un-
der the Irish Data Protection Acts.59 In correspondence
with one of the authors, they cite privacy-by-design as
the reason for this. Apple’s notion of Privacy by Design
in relation to voice assistant data seems to hinge on
three aspects.
Firstly, Apple claims that voice identifier data is di-
vorced from the usual identifiers that Apple users are fa-
miliar with. While Google users log-in with their
account details, under which all their voice data are
then listed, Apple generate device-specific identifiers
that are separate from these identities.
When Siri is turned on, the device creates random identi-
fiers for use with the voice recognition and Siri servers.
These identifiers are used only within Siri and are utilized
to improve the service. If Siri is subsequently turned off, the
device will generate a new random identifier to be used if
Siri is turned back on.60
Nevertheless, these are persistent identifiers. It appears
that if the user never disables Siri in the device’s settings,
as we might expect few users to do rather than simply
52 College bescherming persoonsgegevens (n 28) 20. On opt-out registers in
relation to the Internet of Things, see generally, Lilian Edwards, ‘Privacy,
Security and Data Protection in Smart Cities’ (2016) 2 European Data
Protection Law Review 28, 55.
53 Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens, ‘Bluetrace Bee¨indigt Overtredingen Wifi-




54 Future of Privacy Forum, Mobile Location Analytics Code of Conduct
(Future of Privacy Forum 2013) <https://perma.cc/LC4B-FHY5> ac-
cessed 11 November 2017.
55 Future of Privacy Forum, ‘About Mobile Location Analytics Technology’
(Smart Places) <https://smart-places.org/mobile-location-analytics-opt-out/
about-mobile-location-analytics-technology/> accessed 24 October 2017.
56 Martin and others (n 39).
57 The need for such collaboration was emphasised by the Article 29
Working Party (n 36), 18.
58 Google, ‘Manage Google Voice & Audio Activity’ (Google Search Help)
<https://perma.cc/BEJ3-PM3G> accessed 24 October 2017.
59 The lead author of this article submitted a subject access request to Apple
Distribution International, Ireland, which was denied. The grounds for
the denial are referred to in this article.
60 Apple, Inc, iOS Security: iOS 10 (2017) 49 <https://perma.cc/8EQE-
TFW5> accessed 24 October 2017.
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opting not to use it, the identifier persists throughout
the lifetime of the device. Apple claimed in correspon-
dence that they do not have a technical means to access
the Siri identifier on the device, nor to search the data
by identifier, as they have chosen not to build one.61
Secondly, Apple claim that data usually have their
linked identifiers scrubbed, and are eventually deleted
after certain times have elapsed:
User voice recordings are saved for a six-month period so
that the recognition system can utilize them to better un-
derstand the user’s voice. After six months, another copy is
saved, without its identifier, for use by Apple in improving
and developing Siri for up to two years. A small sub-set of
recordings, transcripts and associated data without identi-
fiers may continue to be used by Apple for ongoing im-
provement and quality assurance of Siri beyond two years.
Additionally, some recordings that reference music, sports
teams and players, and businesses or points of interest are
similarly saved for purposes of improving Siri.62
Thirdly, Apple claim that while Siri is able to recognize
your name, it does this by sending such details from
your phone each time Siri is used, until such a time
where it has not been used for ten minutes, upon which
it is deleted from the remote server.63
Issues with this conception of privacy by design
Upon first glance, the above may seem like privacy-
promoting design features. Yet, there are significant
conceptual flaws with each, as well as the entire system,
that means while Apple currently find it difficult to ac-
cess this data, re-identification would be possible, if not
relatively trivial in some cases.
Firstly, refusing to build a database retrieval tool is
no basis on which to refuse data subject rights. Retrieval
is generally a standard feature of database systems.
Indeed, it is arguably their very purpose. In most cases,
data controllers would have to proactively modify their
systems in order to remove such functionality from
standard database software.64
Secondly, refusing to make the device identifier ac-
cessible to the data subject through the design of the
software while still enabling it to be transmitted regu-
larly to the data controller serves little practical purpose
other than obstructing the data subject’s ability to verify
it is indeed them requesting the data.65 Indeed, this
seems to be doing more to stand in the way of data pro-
tection rights than provide privacy by design. Recital 30
is quite clear that such identifiers would be considered
associated with a natural person, noting that ‘online
identifiers provided by their devices’, including those
provided by RFID (which, being imperceptible, are sim-
ilarly inaccessible to the average data subject), may ei-
ther directly enable profiling or identification, or may
do so indirectly, such as in combination ‘with other in-
formation received by the servers’.
Thirdly, while Apple note that they do not perma-
nently save the name you provide on the server, they do
save many kinds of information of similar or even
greater use in re-identification alongside your identifier.
Indeed, Apple note that because it is onerous to send
details such as relationships with family members, re-
minders, and playlists to the server each time a Siri ses-
sion is started (and would likely introduce unwanted lag
and/or data use), they send those initially, and store
them there. Even if we were to accept that a device spe-
cific identifier was not personal data (despite the rulings
surrounding MAC addresses and even dynamic IP
addresses), a list of their contacts and their relations to
you is relatively trivial even for non-experts to use to
re-identify individuals by using easily accessible data
sources, like social media. It seems similarly likely that
simple re-identification attacks could be formulated
against things such as reminders, particularly as they of-
ten mention the names of organizations or individuals.
Fourthly, a significant body of research has demon-
strated that individuals can be re-identified and
clustered by voiceprints alone, which have such re-
identification potential that they are being used and
proposed for biometric authentication.66 Apple them-
selves even possess several patents in this area from their
own in-house research activities.67 Even based on text
transcripts without the voice data, researchers have
61 ‘[W]e have not built any tool that allows us to retrieve this data’; email
from Apple Distribution International to author (3 August 2017).
62 Apple, Inc (n 60) 50.
63 Ibid 49.
64 Incidentally Apple, bizarrely, argued in correspondence with one of the
authors on the basis of a complaint that data protection rights were not
being upheld, that Siri data was not stored in a ‘filing system’, citing art 2
of the GDPR on material scope. The exemption for data which do not
“form part of a filing system” is explicitly intended to apply only to data
not processed by automated means. It would be unlikely that this line of
argument would find much traction with regulators or in courts.
65 There can be useful reasons for obscuring data from both the user and
the controller at a hardware level—secure enclaves, such as those that
enable fingerprint scanning locally without making the verification data
directly accessible to the rest of the system, work in this way.
66 See eg Najim Dehak and others, ‘Front-End Factor Analysis for Speaker
Verification’ (2011) 19 IEEE Transactions on Audio, Speech, and
Language Processing 788. For opposing work on systems attempting to
dodge re-identification, cf Federico Alegre and others, ‘Evasion and
Obfuscation in Speaker Recognition Surveillance and Forensics’, 2nd
International Workshop on Biometrics and Forensics (IWBF), 27–28 March
2014, Valetta, Malta (IEEE 2014).
67 Jerome R Bellegarda and Kim EA Silverman, ‘Fast, Language-Independent
Method for User Authentication by Voice (Patent US8645137 B2)’ (2014)
<https://www.google.com/patents/US9218809> accessed 27 October 2017;
Adam J Cheyer, ‘Device Access Using Voice Authentication (Patent
US9262612 B2)’ (2016) <https://www.google.com/patents/US9262612>
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demonstrated attacks that can re-identify or cluster in-
dividuals stylometrically, based on the words and gram-
mar they use.68
Compounding this, it is not just how things are said,
but what is being said. Sensitive data can be said and
held in textual form. How to redact terms that might
disclose sensitive data is an active field of research.69
This is very challenging even when the forms of text are
relatively standardized, such as in medical docu-
ments70—standardization not present in messages or
other spoken interactions. As a recent review notes,
‘[g]eneral-purpose privacy solutions for plain text are
scarce and they only focus on the protection of sensitive
terms, which are assumed to be manually identified be-
forehand’.71 These systems have not been developed
with conversation transcripts in mind; it is unclear that
there are effective privacy mechanisms in place here that
would defend against re-identification. Furthermore,
sensitive data is likely to be recorded, including special
categories of data under the GDPR, such as political
opinions. Without guarantees that private and re-
identifiable parts of a conversation have been redacted,
which seem technically difficult, if not currently impos-
sible, to provide, little assurance can be given.
Breaches of data which identify a user but do
not contain contact information
Many of the most high-profile data breaches concern
data which is conventionally personally identifying,
such as full names, home or email addresses, or tele-
phone numbers. In such cases, contacting the individ-
uals affected is relatively straightforward since the
controller holds relevant details which would enable a
communication channel. However such data types
needn’t be involved for significant negative effects to oc-
cur. As discussed in section ‘Case studies of rights lost
in the balance’, there might be unique identifiers from
an end-user’s device such as a MAC address, IMEI
number, and device-generated advertising IDs. Other
examples of data sources that would allow a data subject
to be identified but not easily communicated with in-
clude high-dimensional data, such as web browsing his-
tory or lists of available plugins.72 Web tracking is a
common practice, often using browser fingerprints
rather than an explicit, provided identifier. Data such as
these have, unsurprisingly, been shown to contain sensi-
tive insights. Facebook has in the past used such
approaches to profile individuals by ‘ethnic affinity’, for
example.73 These high-dimensional data are also often
highly identifying. One 2010 study found that 83.6% of
users visiting a website had a unique device fingerprint,
with an additional 5.3% sharing their fingerprint with
just one other record. A breach involving web browsing
data could enable an attacker to single out an individ-
ual’s entire browsing history based on supplementary
data about just a few pages they visited, an attack dem-
onstrated by researchers on German members of parlia-
ment, judges and other public figures.74 Other devices
and modalities than the web are similarly vulnerable.
For example, researchers have been able to identify indi-
viduals from their gait using just the gyroscopic sensors
on a phone for over ten years.75 The resulting societal
situation has meant we are seeing growing instances of
high dimensional datasets covering many data subjects’
activities that are capable of being mined for their sensi-
tive information, but lacking straightforward nominal
identifiers or contact information.
What are the consequences of this? Imagine a breach
of such data. What would be required to occur? A noti-
fication to the data protection authority under Article
33(1) GDPR would be required. But what about a noti-
fication to the individuals whose data has been accessed?
That falls under Article 34, which states that ‘[w]hen the
personal data breach is likely to result in a high risk to
the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the control-
ler shall communicate the personal data breach to the
data subject without undue delay’. This is the case un-
less there were appropriate technical and organizational
accessed 27 October 2017; Allen P Haughay, ‘User Profiling for Voice Input
Processing (Patent US9633660 B2)’ (2017) <https://www.google.com/pat
ents/US9633660> accessed 27 October 2017.
68 Sadia Afroz and others, ‘Doppelga¨nger Finder: Taking Stylometry to the
Underground’, 2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (IEEE
2014).
69 David Sa´nchez and Montserrat Batet, ‘Toward Sensitive Document
Release with Privacy Guarantees’ (2017) 59 Engineering Applications of
Artificial Intelligence 23.
70 See eg Stephane M Meystre and others, ‘Automatic de-Identification of
Textual Documents in the Electronic Health Record: A Review of Recent
Research’ (2010) 10 BMC Medical Research Methodology 70.
71 Sa´nchez and Batet (n 69) 24.
72 Seungyeop Han, Jaeyeon Jung and David Wetherall, ‘A Study of Third-
Party Tracking by Mobile Apps in the Wild’ (University of Washington,
Tech. Rep. UW-CSE-12-03-01 2012) <https://perma.cc/5L38-VLQN>
accessed 15 November 2017.
73 Julia Angwin and Terry Parris Jr, ‘Facebook Lets Advertisers Exclude
Users by Race—ProPublica’ (ProPublica, 28 October 2016) <https://
www.propublica.org/article/facebook-lets-advertisers-exclude-users-by-
race> accessed 31 October 2017. Note, it is unclear whether Facebook
advertising operates in this way within the European Union.
74 Mark Ward ‘It is easy to expose users’ secret web habits, say researchers’
(BBC News, 31 July 2017), <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
40770393> accessed 15 November 2017.
75 Jani Mantyjarvi and others, ‘Identifying Users of Portable Devices from
Gait Pattern with Accelerometers’, Proceedings of the IEEE International
Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, 2005 (ICASSP ’05)
(IEEE 2005).
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protection measures that ‘render the personal data
unintelligible to any person who is not authorised to ac-
cess it’; subsequent measures to mitigate the risk had
been taken; or it would involve ‘disproportionate effort’,
in which case a ‘public communication or similar mea-
sure’ could be substituted.
Firstly, in some cases an argument could be made
that the personal data were unintelligible, and therefore
they do not trigger individual notification requirements
under Article 34. This might indeed be the case where
data were suitably encrypted with state-of-the-art tech-
nologies. It is important, however, to draw a distinction
between unintelligibility owing to encryption, and
merely not being able to associate a record with a partic-
ular individual without supplementary data points.
What may seem unintelligible, and therefore non-
identifiable from the data controller’s perspective, might
in fact be identifiable with access to minimal additional
data, as demonstrated in the aforementioned attack on
the browsing habits of German public figures. As at-
tackers will likely hold different and usually illicitly ac-
quired, personal datasets not available to the breached
data controller, this distinction becomes highly impor-
tant to consider.
Secondly comes the thornier topic of the ‘dispropor-
tionate effort’ that may be required to communicate to
individuals. Data such as cookies, browser fingerprints,
or device-specific identifiers are not traditional means
of identifying someone for the purposes of communi-
cating with them. However, they are frequently as-
signed and collected by behavioural advertising
networks precisely to ‘communicate’ with individuals
through the specific medium of in-browser or in-app
advertisements. In a lighter vein, some well-known
internet pranks involve buying eerily targeted adverts
aimed at individual friends, intending to unsettle
them.76 Such examples demonstrate that even without
personal contact details for traditional communication
channels, such organizations may have ways to contact
their data subjects despite lacking traditional contact
details.
Thus, one option for such organizations to commu-
nicate breaches to affected individuals in a manner that
could be deemed proportionate might even be to pur-
chase advertising space, using the same data to target
them once more, in order to tell them their data had
been breached. Particularly when it comes to shadowy
data brokers that the majority of data subjects are un-
aware of the identity of, let alone details of their
practices or how to contact them, a ‘public communica-
tion’ would be unlikely to be effective, not least because
these companies have purposefully never developed
channels or a capacity to communicate with data
subjects.
Another option would be to facilitate communica-
tion via those service providers who do have the capac-
ity to link non-traditional identifiers with traditional
communication channels, and who could facilitate the
communication of a data breach from an organization
to the affected individual. Selecting an appropriate inter-
mediary would depend on the context, but for instance,
a device manufacturer/operating system provider like
Apple or Google can readily link a device ID to an email
address, and thus allow an ad network who identifies
users by device IDs to communicate a breach to the af-
fected individuals by email. Another example might be a
cellphone network service provider who can easily link
SIM numbers to IMEI numbers and thus facilitate
breach notifications via SMS or phone call.
While the viability of various breach notification
measures is highly context-dependent, these examples
demonstrate another way in which privacy-as-
confidentiality is in tension with data protection
principles—in this case, transparency regarding breach
notifications. Technical choices which promote privacy-
as-unlinkability (eg not being able to associate high-
dimensional browsing data to a relevant contact ad-
dress), could end up denying data subjects the right to
know about breaches which have a high risk of affecting
them.
Putting the data protection in DPbD
If DPbD risks taking away rights, as in the cases illus-
trated above, how might we rectify or ameliorate this?
Here, we propose some approaches that might help do
this, assess their possibilities and pitfalls, and place them
in legal context.
Parallel systems to fulfil DP rights
One set of options would be to maintain parallel sys-
tems with the explicit purpose of upholding these rights.
Here, we outline two main types of these systems in le-
gal and technical context: systems designed to retain
data to provide access and better enable erasure and ob-
jection, and systems designed to process additional
data, which may be provided by the data subject, to
make re-identification possible.
76 Brian Swichkow, ‘How I Pranked My Roommate with Eerily Targeted
Facebook Ads’ (ghostinfluence [blog], 6 September 2014) <https://perma.
cc/9FGR-JVWQ> accessed 1 November 2017.
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Obligations to retain data
In College van burgemeester en wethouders van
Rotterdam v MEE Rijkeboer (hereafter Rijkeboer),77 the
CJEU was referred a question relating to a case where
Mr Rijkeboer, a Dutch citizen, asked the Mayor and
Executive Board of Rotterdam to provide him with de-
tails of the third parties to which any information relat-
ing to him held by the municipality had been
communicated to. In Mr Rijkeboer’s case, the data con-
troller had replied positively but partially, providing
only information relating to the previous year, as Dutch
law and practice provided that the data from the year
preceding had been wiped. The question to the court
was whether, in the absence of a timeframe provided
within the access rights of Article 12 of the DPD,
Member States could impose deletion of such data—
which was in a sense metadata about the data held on
Mr Rijkeboer78—after a certain period of time—
meaning that such access rights could not refer to data
outside this time period.
The Mayor and Executive Board of Rotterdam, the
United Kingdom, the Czech, Spanish, and Dutch gov-
ernments submitted that the right of access ‘exists only
in the present and not in the past’, while the Greek gov-
ernment and the European Commission submitted that
it applies not only to the present but also extends into
the past.79 The court ruled that such a right must neces-
sarily relate to the past to ensure the practical effect of
access, erasure and rectification provisions,80 that the
exact time limitation was up to further Member State
rule-making, but that a period of one year alone does
‘not constitute a fair balance of the interest and obliga-
tion at issue’ unless it can be shown that anything longer
would lead to an ‘excessive burden’ on the controller.81
Indeed, any time limit upon this metadata should con-
stitute ‘a fair balance between, on the one hand, the in-
terest of the data subject in protecting his privacy, in
particular by way of his rights to object and to bring le-
gal proceedings and, on the other, the burden which the
obligation to store that information represents for the
controller’.82
This ruling is pertinent to the current discussion, as
it directly places the question of data subjects’ rights
against what the court described as the ‘burden’ that
data storage places on the controller—a burden which
consists increasingly of securing this data against adver-
saries, rather than just the simple cost of storage media.
The Court acknowledged that this was a trade-off that
the DPD did not contemplate explicitly; the same can
be said of the GDPR.
Another relevant point from this ruling is the distinc-
tion made by Court between two types of data in light
of the right of access.83 Firstly, that the ‘basic data’, used
for the functionality of local service provision, was being
stored for a longer period than the data regarding the
transfers (which of course may be sensitive to the data
subject), was noted to be a source of the unfair balance
that had been struck by the Rotterdam Mayor and
Executive Board.84 Put differently, one could say the
controller adopted a different retention policy for ‘con-
tent data’ (ie the actual personal data such as individ-
uals’ names) as opposed to ‘metadata’ (eg information
relating to how the personal data was used and its
source). This has an interesting, although not exact, par-
allel to some alleged PETs. In these technologies, we can
also distinguish between different types of data; the full,
potentially identifiable data collected, and the trans-
formed data which is now more difficult to link to data
subjects. The former is erased after a certain time-
frame,85 often at the time that it is transformed into the
latter for retention. Is this erasure a “fair balance”?
Distinguishing different types of information for the
purposes of data management is a common industry
practice. Yet, the ways in which data are classified
within organizations do not always have neat analogues
the legal framework. Take the Siri identifiers. Siri identi-
fiers clearly single out a data subject, as they are persis-
tent identifiers that link to a device typically only used
by one person. One of the major purposes of this system
is to deliver a personalized voice assistant to a data sub-
ject. As a result, Article 11(1) GDPR, which relieves data
controllers from having to ‘maintain, acquire or process
additional information in order to identify the data
77 College van burgemeester en wethouders van Rotterdam v M.E.E.
Rijkeboer, case C-553/07, 7 May 2009. See also case commentaries by
Ce´cile De Terwangne, ‘L’e´tendue Dans Le Temps Du Droit D’acce`s Aux
Informations Sur Les Destinataires de Donne´es a` Caracte`re Personnel:
Note Sous C.J.U.E, 22 De´cembre 2010’ [2011] Revue du Droit des
Technologies de l’Information 65.; and G Overkleeft-Verburg, ‘EU sHof
van Justitie 7 mei 2009, zaaknr. C-553/07’, (2009) Jurisprudentie
Bestuurecht 159.
78 Note that the Rijkeboer judgement does not refer to this as metadata, we
do so here for explanatory purposes.
79 Rijkeboer (n 77), paras 37–39.
80 Ibid para 54.
81 Ibid para 66.
82 Ibid para 64.
83 Ibid para 42 et seq.
84 Ibid.
85 In the case of Siri, Apple further de-identifies this data after a six month
period, noting that ‘User voice recordings are saved for a six-month pe-
riod so that the recognition system can utilize them to better understand
the user’s voice. After six months, another copy is saved, without its
identifier, for use by Apple in improving and developing Siri for up to
two years.’ See Apple, Inc (n 60) 50.
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subject for the sole purpose of complying’ with the
Regulation (notably accommodating data subject
rights), does not apply. And even if it were, Article
11(2) still enables data subjects to have their data sub-
ject rights accommodated upon providing additional
information that does allow the controller to (re-) iden-
tify them. However, the Regulation does not seem to
contemplate that technological developments have al-
lowed identification of a data subject for the purpose of
service delivery and data processing, but not for the
purposes of data access.
In this case, how might a data controller use a paral-
lel system to augment the identification process being
undertaken for service delivery to also allow data access?
Apple IDs could be stored alongside Siri identifiers in a
separate database. While Recital 64 of the GDPR does
note that a controller ‘should not retain personal data
for the sole purpose of being able to react to potential
requests’, here the controller already holds both sets of
personal data, and only needs to establish a link between
them. Asking controllers to purposively make it difficult
to consistently find a data subject across many datasets
held seems problematic in light of the practical chal-
lenges of GDPR implementation. A mechanism could
also be implemented on the device to obtain the identi-
fiers used. The core question that relates to these
approaches is of security. A centralized list in the first
case presents a significantly heightened re-identification
risk were attackers to gain access to this data. Both op-
tions jeopardize what one might suspect to be among
Apple’s deeper aims—to claim their hands are tied
when faced with law enforcement or intelligence services
requests, as they have done publicly before.86
While these approaches rely on burying data in a
haystack, it may also be possible for Apple to provide
this data to users in a form only they can access, using
encryption techniques. In this case, the data controller
would not be retaining the data in a form they could ac-
cess, but instead providing portability from the outset.
Indeed, users might find it useful to have a repository of
speech data and transcripts in order to quickly train any
new system, were they to change providers. If data pro-
tection by design means access and portability by de-
sign, there are feasible design solutions that could form
part of the strategy from the outset. This may also allow
a user the effective right of erasure; the data they hold
could be automatically compared with the de-identified
database, and the matches removed.
Just as Rijkeboer made the data controller have to re-
think their data retention process, it seems feasible that
future rulings could also take aim further upstream, at
the “fair balances” being struck in the design process.
Acquiring additional information (Articles 11; 12(2)
and Recital 57, GDPR)
Re-identifying data to an acceptable percentage of cer-
tainty to exercise data protection rights may be difficult
in practice for any data controller practicing certain
types of DPbD, regardless of intention. The GDPR rec-
ognizes this in Articles 11 and 12(2), which exempt the
data controller from having to accommodate data sub-
ject rights if it can demonstrate it is not in a position to
identify the data subject. Article 11(2) however, grants
data subjects the ability to provide additional data to
enable such (re-)identification, something not every
data subject might be inclined to do.87 The final call
though, seems to be in the hands of the controller.
Pursuant to Article 12(2) in fine, the data controller still
has an opportunity to demonstrate not being in a posi-
tion to (re-)identify, even after being provided with ad-
ditional information by the data subject.
Having said all that, it would still require a consider-
able burden of proof to adequately demonstrate reiden-
tification is not possible, even despite additional
information being provided by the data subject. This
does not only appear from the GDPR’s general empha-
sis on accountability and weightier focus on data con-
trollers’ responsibilities, but also manifests itself
through Recital 57. This Recital notes that while the
data controller ‘should not be obliged to acquire addi-
tional information in order to identify the data subject’
to comply with the regulation, they ‘should not refuse
to take additional information provided by the data
subject in order to support the exercise or his or her
rights’.88 Taking a step back, it is of course important to
emphasize that an (alleged) inability to fully accommo-
date data subject rights cannot be exploited to evade
data protection law altogether, and that all other provi-
sions (notably those in Article 5 and 6) still apply in
full.89
An unanswered question remains—such acquired or
volunteered additional information still requires a re-
identification process that while very possible, may not
be straightforward to the data controller to undertake.
Indeed, data controllers may not have expertise in this
86 Karl Stephan, ‘Apple Versus the Feds: How a Smartphone Stymied the
FBI’ (2017) 6 IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine 103.
87 Indeed, as data are increasingly processed by cloud compute services, in-
dividuals may not store or retain the copies themselves needed to identify
them, particularly when this data is not used directly by data subjects.
88 Recital 57, GDPR.
89 Art 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 1/2010 on the Concepts of ‘Controller’
xand ‘Processor.’ (WP 169, 16 February 2010).
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space, particularly when it does not form part of their
core processing activities. While Recital 57 shines little
light on this, Recital 26 provides some guidance,
suggesting that factors such as cost, time, available and
emerging technology should be taken into
consideration.90
This provides an interesting avenue for a policy
intervention—a possibly controversial one—that could
support data subjects’ rights. While theoretical attacks
for re-identification are often possible, and would likely
undermine the privacy-by-design approaches taken
above, there is a valid argument about whether these
technologies are ‘available’ in the context of Recital 26.
While they might be available to attackers, and traded,
like stolen data, on shady online markets, this creates an
imbalance between the deployable technologies available
to data controllers and those available to their adversar-
ies. Is there an obligation on data controllers to develop
(or to procure from security companies) state-of-the-
art re-identification tools in order to make data subject
rights possible?
There is a parallel here with other examples, albeit
not all in the EU, in which certain individuals are owed
redress by an organization who lacks the means of iden-
tifying them. After a U.S. financial lender, Ally
Financial, was found to have racially discriminatory car
loan pricing, they were ordered to used census data to
estimate which of their borrowers were Black, Hispanic,
or Asian in order to (imperfectly) identify the rightful
recipients of compensation.91 Similar efforts might be
beneficial in the case of data breaches, where publicly
available information could be mined in order to iden-
tify a means of contacting affected individuals who are
otherwise only known to the controller by their brows-
ing history, device fingerprint, or other data.
Data protection law, in an attempt to be technologi-
cally neutral, is silent on imposing specific innovation
requirements on data controllers—which is probably a
good thing, as mandating technological advancement
through legislating it seems like a misguided idea.92 But
were governments, academia, or civil society to develop
and make re-identification tools for high-dimensional
data publicly available, with a codebase compatible with
many types of commercial systems, it would be hard to
deny these technologies were ‘available’ in the sense of
Recital 26. Additionally, the possibility for certification
bodies outlined in the GDPR may provide a further ave-
nue for keeping up-to-speed on the state of the art tech-
nologies in this space.93 Yet, this comes with its own
security risks. Not only are these tools then available to
attackers, but they may even be installed and calibrated
on the systems that data is being illicitly obtained from,
leaving adversaries a little like ‘a kid in a candy store’.
When these re-identification mechanisms are already
designed however, and out in the published research lit-
erature, ‘putting a lid on them’ would appear to be a
poor policy approach. Even where the codebase is
scrappy and unreliable, these are precisely the types of
tools that ‘script kiddie’ adversaries are used to working
with. Imagining that making these tools more useful
and deployable would only serve to help attackers is
likely to underestimate adversaries’ existing capacity to
use and generate knowledge to valorize stolen personal
data, as well as to understate the benefit of such tools
for giving data subjects more control over the data they
are entitled to legal rights over. Indeed, making them
more usable may not vastly increase the capabilities of
attackers that were always willing to string together
unreliable code, and may primarily serve to empower
data subjects to manage risks relating to them.
Making trade-offs with Data Protection Impact
Assessments
Given the value-laden nature of these trade-offs, it is
important that they are made in an explicit way, with
care and with rigour. As it stands, the GDPR, being ex-
tremely vague about what DPbD means, does not ac-
knowledge either in recitals or the enacting terms the
existence of trade-offs within design approaches. When
these trade-offs, as we have shown, involve the funda-
mental rights of data subjects, this is unacceptable.94
Data Protection Impact Assessments95 (DPIAs) are
positioned as a potentially apt point in the compliance
process to consider the trade-offs present when employ-
ing DPbD strategies. DPIAs are the main form of
90 Recital 26, GDPR: ‘To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to
be used to identify the natural person, account should be taken of all ob-
jective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for
identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the
time of the processing and technological developments.’
91 Annamaria Andriotis and Rachel Louise Ensign, ‘U.S. Uses Race Test to




92 This is not to say that the state should not have a role in steering innova-
tion, or strategically funding particular areas—indeed, it often has—but
that innovation policy is more complex than imposing a statutory re-
quirement. See generally, Mariana Mazzucato, The Entrepreneurial State:
Debunking Public Vs. Private Sector Myths (Anthem Press, London 2015).
93 Art 42, GDPR.
94 The very ability for an individual to have access to their personal data
forms an explicit part of the fundamental right to the protection of per-
sonal data: art 8, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
OJ 2010 C 83/389 (hereafter the ‘Charter’).
95 Art 35, GDPR.
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preemptive analysis and documentation requirement in
the GDPR, taking particular aim at high-risk process-
ing.96 The GDPR explicitly, albeit in the recitals, notes
that the ‘risk to the rights and freedoms of natural per-
sons, of varying likelihood and severity, may result from
personal data processing which could lead to physical,
material or non-material damage, in particular: [. . .]
where data subjects might be deprived of their rights
and freedoms or prevented from exercising control over
their personal data’.97 Accordingly, the Article 29
Working Party identifies, as one of the criteria leading
to high risks to data subjects, situations where ‘the pro-
cessing in itself “prevents data subjects from exercising a
right or using a service or a contract”’.98
Yet in the same guidance, it is worth noting that
DPbD gets only a fleeting mention as another pre-
emptive approach comparable to DPIA; the Working
Party is silent on including DPbD itself as a topic within
DPIAs.99 It is furthermore easy to see how DPbD mea-
sures such as those discussed could be seen as one of
several ‘measures envisaged to address the risks, includ-
ing safeguards, security measures and mechanisms’.100
As processing undertaken in response to otherwise risky
processing with the intention of decreasing that risk,
they might escape the scrutiny applied to the original
concern. While an infinitely recursive DPIA is highly
undesirable, so is one that lacks appropriate reflexivity.
While a DPIA might, potentially and with further
clarification, provide a venue for considering trade-offs,
this approach has a number of limitations owing in par-
ticular to the weakening of certain key provisions in the
final text of the GDPR.101 While the requirement to
‘seek the views of data subjects or their representatives’
during the DPIA process suggests that those individuals
affected can articulate their views about appropriate
trade-offs, this obligation is limited. It is only required
‘where appropriate’ and ‘without prejudice to the pro-
tection of commercial or public interests’. The exemp-
tion from consulting data subjects where it might affect
‘the security of the processing operations’, presents yet
another situation in which protection of data through
obscurity could excuse the pursuit of other substantive
data protection obligations. As a result of these limita-
tions, such consultations may often in practice consti-
tute a form-filling task, particularly as these views to be
sought are not grounded in any particular task or
question, and are not (as we discuss further below) re-
quired to be published or publicized.
Right to information about privacy
architectures
As we have described,102 we can increasingly locate ex-
amples where data subjects’ personal data is being pro-
cessed without the accompanying data subject rights
effectively being enabled. Yet it seems rare for data sub-
jects to be informed before the time of collection or
processing that such rights will not apply. Where they
are, claims seem highly generalized. Apple’s Privacy
Policy, for example, simply states that they ‘may decline
to process [access] requests that are frivolous/vexatious,
jeopardize the privacy of others, are extremely impracti-
cal, or for which access is not otherwise required by lo-
cal law.’103 Which data will be ‘extremely impractical’ to
exercise rights over? Which will be considered to ‘jeop-
ardize the privacy of others’? Without this information,
it seems unclear that a proper evaluation could be made
by a data subject as to whether she wishes to entrust her
personal data to such a controller.
Must a data controller, explicitly and without request
at the time data are obtained, warn a data subject that
the rights they might expect do not exist? This would
seem critical if, as data protection law expects, data
subjects are to play a part in managing the risks in ac-
cordance with their own preferences. There is a require-
ment to provide ‘information necessary to ensure fair
and transparent processing’, including ‘the existence of
the right to request from the controller access to and
rectification or erasure of personal data’.104 Yet, it is
unclear whether this is a provision that requires the ex-
istence of these rights in a general sense—an awareness
raising measure, as well as one seeking to provide logis-
tical support (eg through pointing to the relevant con-
troller contact details)—or whether this is an existence
of these rights in applied context, considering each type
of data processed by the controller. We feel that in light
of the overarching transparency principle in Article
5(1), linked explicitly to Articles 13–14 in Article 12(1),
the latter reading is well-supported. Considering that
Article 11(2) contemplates times when there might be
no ‘existence’ of these rights, it makes sense that this re-
quirement would not apply in those cases. Does this
96 See Reuben Binns, ‘Data Protection Impact Assessments: A Meta-
Regulatory Approach’ (2017) 7 International Data Privacy Law 22
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/idpl/ipw027>.
97 Recital 75, GDPR.
98 Art 29 Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Data Protection Impact
Assessment (DPIA) and Determining whether Processing is “likely to
Result in a High Risk” for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/679’ (WP 248
rev.01, 4 October 2017) 11.
99 Ibid 14.
100 Art 35(7)(d), GDPR.
101 Binns (n 96).
102 See section ‘Case studies of rights lost’.
103 Apple Inc., ‘Privacy Policy’ (19 September 2017). <http://perma.cc/
3DC2-M7Z5> accessed 13 November 2017.
104 Arts 13(2)(b) and 14(2)(c), GDPR.
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mean that data controllers would have to invert the ob-
ligation, and explicitly tell data subjects that their rights
will not be honoured? That would be very useful, but it
seems less clear. If this was the case, would controllers
also have to tell data subjects of the non-existence of au-
tomated decision-making, which in Articles 13(2)(f)/
14(2)(g) is phrased in a very similar way? Given that
‘solely automated’, ‘significant’ automated decisions
seem rare in practice,105 more often than not this would
serve to bulk up information notices in a quite mean-
ingless way.
However, it is clear that there is an obligation on
data controllers to provide the reasons for their non-
fulfilment of a specific access request ex post. In contrast
to the unclear scope of ex ante information require-
ments, relevant ex post information requirements expect
controllers to provide more detailed information on
when subject rights are not available and why.106 But
there is no explicit hook in Articles 13–14 for a data
controller to provide information ex ante about the
DPbD measures that might be restricting such rights so
that a data subject might assess them, nor provide infor-
mation on the safeguards being applied to their data
that might affect their ability to exercise their rights.
Given the importance of these rights to the data protec-
tion regime as a whole, this seems problematic in rela-
tion to the transparency and accountability principles of
the GDPR.107
We argue however that such a requirement can be
read into the obligation to provide ‘meaningful infor-
mation about the logic involved, as well as the signifi-
cance and the envisaged consequences of such
processing for the data subject’ of automated decision
making.108 Commentators have historically viewed the
potential of automated decision rights in relation to ‘al-
gorithmic accountability’ discussions, through the lens
of ‘decisions’ individuals encounter in their day-to-day-
lives such as credit scoring or behavioural targeting.109
Yet, in relation to the envisaged removal of fundamental
rights using automated processing, we argue that an au-
tomated decision (‘which may include a measure’)110
could also be considered in relation to processing that
happens internally, within a data controller or proces-
sor. These rights have been considered strongly re-
stricted by both a restriction to be ‘solely’ automated,
and to trigger ‘legal’ or ‘similarly significant’ effects on
individuals. There is strong reason to believe that the
systems we have been discussing in this paper meet both
conditions. Firstly, privacy enhancing technologies
rarely have humans in-the-loop after their initial
setup—usually this would undermine mechanisms re-
ducing information disclosure—and as a result, we can
broadly think of these technologies as ‘solely’ auto-
mated. Secondly, the removal of rights would arguably
have both a ‘legal effect’, in the sense of changing a data
subject’s position with respect to Article 11, and a ‘simi-
larly [significant]’ effect, impacting on fundamental
rights and freedoms.
As there appear to be grounds to meet this condition,
we lastly have to consider whether or not a discernable
‘decision’ has been made. The most clear indication that
it has in the case of DPbD is that Recital 71 specifically
includes that the scope of automated decisions ‘may in-
clude a measure’—the precise terminology in Article
25(1) describing DPbD as ‘technical and organisational
measures necessary to ensure, for the processing con-
cerned, that this Regulation is implemented’. Some
might say that these measures happened at the moment
of system design, not at the point of processing, and
therefore, not being solely automated nor affecting a
single data subject at that point, no information obliga-
tion exists. Yet, to apply this reasoning to profiling sys-
tems, such as behavioural advertising, would be absurd.
While at a mechanical level, visiting a webpage might
trigger the application of a pre-built profile to deliver
advertising,111 the ‘logic involved’ would presumably
not (and seemingly not in the eyes of the A29WP)112 be
restricted to the last leg alone—that a user requested on-
line components, which matched a browser fingerprint
to a profile accessed a database, and therefore was pro-
vided specific content—but would refer to the broader
system insofar as it was relevant to the final decision,
105 Lilian Edwards and Michael Veale, ‘Slave to the Algorithm? Why a
“Right to an Explanation” is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking
For’ (2017) 16 Duke L & Tech Rev 18.
106 Recital 59, GDPR: ‘The controller should be obliged to respond to re-
quests from the data subject without undue delay and at the latest within
one month and to give reasons where the controller does not intend to
comply with any such requests.’; Art 12(4) stating if ‘the controller does
not take action on the request of the data subject, the controller shall in-
form the data subject without delay and at the latest within one month of
receipt of the request of the reasons for not taking action’.
107 Indeed, it could be argued that fundamental rights are at stake here in
some situations: art 8 Charter in particular, but potentially also other
rights and freedoms such as non-discrimination (art 21 Charter) or and
freedom of expression (Art.11 Charter).
108 Art 13(2)(f)/14(2)(g), GDPR.
109 See eg Lee A Bygrave, ‘Minding the Machine: Article 15 of the EC Data
Protection Directive and Automated Profiling’ (2001) 17 Computer Law
& Security Report 17; Mireille Hildebrandt, ‘The Dawn of a Critical
Transparency Right for the Profiling Era’ in J Bus and others (eds.)
Digital Enlightenment Yearbook 2012 (IOS Press, 2012); Edwards and
Veale (n 105).
110 Recital 71, GDPR.
111 The A29WP indeed contemplate the possibility of advertising meeting
the art 22 requirements. See art 29 Working Party (A29WP), ‘Guidelines
on Automated Individual Decision-making and Profiling for the
Purposes of Regulation 2016/679’ (WP 251rev.01, 6 February 2018).
112 Ibid.
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including the construction of the profile in question. In a
similar manner, rights to understand DPbD systems which
are applied automatically would presumably have some
broader, systemic notion applicable to them as well.
In the case of a ‘measure’ such as DPbD, it might be
hard to imagine what a right to a human ‘in-the-loop’,
the core remedy offered in Article 22 that Articles 13–15
refer to, would look like in this situation. Yet, these in-
formation rights are not explicitly fully restricted by the
compatibility of the remedy in a separate article.
Indeed, we note that not only does the terminology in
Articles 13–15 refer to ‘automated decision-making’,
without either of the conditions in Article 22, it also
counsels that it is ‘at least’, not only, in the context of
Article 22 that these rights trigger, opening the door for
less restrictive judicial interpretations in the future.
The effect of this reading of automated decision infor-
mation rights on DPbD measures which prevent the ef-
fective exercise of other rights would be twofold. It would
firstly oblige controllers to provide ‘meaningful informa-
tion about the [. . .] significance and envisaged conse-
quences’ of such processing—the loss of data protection
rights. They would have to do this ex ante—the Article 29
Working Party has recently taken the view that the ‘mean-
ingful information’ rights in Articles 13–14 should pro-
vide identical information to those in Article 15.113 At
minimum, this provision would have the same effect we
argue is present in Article 13(2)(b) and 14(2)(c) above,
reinforcing our reading of the GDPR that to inform data
subjects of these lack of rights is mandatory. A more gen-
erous reading could even see it go beyond this. The ‘con-
sequences’ of the loss of data protection rights include a
loss of control, and as such this might entail a discussion
of the re-identification risk were such data to be accessed
without authorization. Insofar as ‘envisaged’ is under-
stood as ‘intended’114 rather than ‘foreseen’, it could be
countered that the data controller does not ‘intend’ a data
breach, and therefore would not be required to inform
data subjects about its potential consequences. Yet, given
that such a breach could be highly damaging to data
subjects, it is likely to trigger the separate ‘significance’ re-
quirement, even were it to dodge the ‘envisaged’ one.
The second consequence relates to the ‘meaningful
information about the logic involved’ requirement. This
gets us closer to an obligation on the data controller to
provide information about the extent, form and struc-
ture of relevant safeguards in a way that can be assessed
by the data subject—or indeed, given these are ex ante
information rights not requiring an existing data subject
to trigger, by interested parties more broadly. The
Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘logic’ as ‘a system or
set of principles underlying the arrangements of ele-
ments in a computer or electronic device so as to per-
form a specified task.’ Where the task is partial de-
identification or some other computational transforma-
tion to render such data difficult to single out, and thus
deprive and individual data subject of certain data pro-
tection rights, this would indicate that a basic—and
importantly, a ‘meaningful’—schematic would be pro-
vided. The ‘meaningful’ condition, one of the few
changes to these rights from the DPD, obliges informa-
tion about this logic to relate to the data subject in a
useful way—but given a lack of detailed requirements
written in the GDPR, we will likely have to wait for this
right to be tested to understand how far it will take data
subjects.
Despite a lack of detailed requirements relating to in-
formation rights, following Articles 5(2) and 24(1),
data controllers are expected to be able to adequately
demonstrate compliance with all GDPR provisions,
which includes security and DPbD obligations. As dis-
cussed above,115 DPIAs might be an important venue
for demonstrating this compliance and hammering out
the trade-offs faced. As it stands however, they do not
seem to be a reliable transparency mechanism—there is
no obligation to publish these documents under the
GDPR, and indeed industry opinion is highly opposed
to such an obligation, usually on grounds of their
potential to contain trade secrets and proprietary infor-
mation.116 When passed to a DPA as part of prior
113 Ibid 15. For commentary on how this plays into controversy on the issue,
see Michael Veale and Lilian Edwards, ‘Clarity, Surprises, and Further
Questions in the Article 29 Working Party Draft Guidance on
Automated Decision-Making and Profiling’ (2018) 34(2) Computer Law
& Security Review.
114 The German version of the law is perhaps better translated in this way. See
Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt and Luciano Floridi, ‘Why a Right to
Explanation of Automated Decision-making does not exist in the General
Data Protection Regulation’ (2017) 7 International Data Privacy Law 2, 84.
115 See above at section ‘Making trade-offs with Data Protection Impact
Assessments’.
116 See the responses to the draft version of A29WP (n 98) in the response to
a Freedom of Information request from the European Commission, DG
Justice and Consumers (9 August 2017) <https://www.asktheeu.org/en/
request/a29wp_data_protection_impact_ass> accessed 15 November
2017, in particular the enclosed response from DIGITALEUROPE ex-
pressing that view, among others. Indeed, trade secrets or intellectual
property have been a traditional carve-out in the area of rights to ‘logic
of the processing’. Yet, according to Malgieri, ‘if a conflict should arise
between privacy rights of individuals and trade secret rights of businesses,
privacy rights should prevail on trade secret rights.’ See Gianclaudio
Malgieri, ‘Trade Secrets v Personal Data: A Possible Solution for
Balancing Rights’ (2016) 6 International Data Privacy Law 2, 103. Recital
63 GDPR does acknowledge access rights should not adversely affect
‘trade secrets or intellectual property and in particular the copyright pro-
tecting the software,’ but also mentions that such arguments cannot be
(ab)used to refuse access altogether. Similarly, the EU Trade Secrets
Directive also notes that its provisions ‘should not affect the rights and
obligations laid down’ in the DPD. See Recital 35, Directive (EU) 2016/
943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the
protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade
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consultation,117 the documents may become subject to
local Freedom of Information laws, but given that data
controllers can avoid prior consultation by claiming
they have mitigated the risk, it is yet to be seen how
common prior consultation will be in practice.
The problem with the lack of publishing of this infor-
mation does not relate to an imaginary world where en-
gaged data subjects pore over the minutiae of DPIAs,
but in general the lack of rigorous scrutiny expected of a
pluralist society afforded to organizational or technical
approaches to privacy. Oversight is unlikely to be useful
if only provided at an individual level. Just as individ-
uals suffer from consent fatigue, many of the solutions
for the increasingly complex processing ecosystem today
risk of a ‘transparency fallacy’, where the responsibility
for obtaining and digesting complex information about
computational systems falls, unhelpfully, on the data
subject.118 Instead, having third parties placed as benefi-
ciaries of some information rights would be a useful fu-
ture step. While DPAs have significantly increased
powers to investigate data controllers, this usually hap-
pens only after a complaint has been raised.119 It is diffi-
cult to raise a complaint about improper or ineffective
applications of privacy or data protection by design
without some insight into the system infrastructure—
that is, until such systems fail in a large and noticeable
way, at which point transparency is hardly a helpful
remedy. In theory, high-risk processing where risks can-
not be sufficiently mitigated must involve consultation
and prior authorization with the responsible DPA.120
Yet, the precise risks we have been discussing occur dur-
ing this mitigation process, and the trade-offs are com-
monly ignored—because they present separate risks
from the initial high-risk processing, we are not opti-
mistic they will be flagged and identified. Article 80(1)
and 80(2) envisage some role for bodies to exercise
rights either mandated by a data subject or (optionally,
subject to member state derogations) without them, but
these rights do not include those concerning informa-
tion provision. Aligning information rights with those
that can understand, investigate and report potential
breaches, or simply to publicly highlight the existence of
state-of-the-art technologies that can better make the
trade-offs between different aspects of privacy and data
protection in the context of DPbD, seems like a require-
ment for the future, particularly as systems become
more pervasive, invisible and complex.
Conclusions
Privacy by design was initially defined as a holistic con-
cept. Amidst the vigorous and welcome research in how
technological approaches can help us achieve it, its well-
rounded nature has been somewhat lost. PbD, and the
DPbD now mandated by law, is seen increasingly as a
synonym for the formal privacy enhancing technologies
literature that take reducing unwanted information dis-
closure as their sole goal—partly, at least, as it is a math-
ematically tractable, single optimization target. These
literatures undoubtedly provide useful tools for both
data subjects and controllers—we do not contest that—
but they are not designed with data protection in mind,
when we are sorely in need of such technologies to help
us uphold data protection principles in today’s data-
rich world.
Because data protection does not take sole aim at in-
formation disclosure, but a framework of rights and ob-
ligations intended to strike fair balances between a wide
array of societal aims, fundamental rights and personal
freedoms, we argue that the way that deployed PbD so-
lutions trade-off against these rights while leaving sig-
nificant residual risk to data subjects is problematic. We
accept it is often impossible to have everything at once,
but believe that this means decisions about which rights
and risks to prioritize over others must be openly dis-
cussed and decisions rendered accountable. At a high
level, the GDPR’s transparency and accountability prin-
ciples would appear to necessitate it. DPIAs are a good
venue to make trade-offs, but are intransparent from a
lack of publishing requirements, and recent guidance
around them has omitted obligations to consider DPbD
specifically.
This is particularly important as controllers do have
economic incentives to minimize obligations to fulfil
data subject requests. While we believe that they are
welcome to maximize their economic logics within the
boundaries of the law, and that doing so is not a nefari-
ous aim, there is a danger that a range of practices
secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure, 2016
OJ (L 157) 1.
117 Art 36(3)(g), GDPR.
118 Edwards and Veale (n 105).
119 Indeed, given the resource limitations of DPAs, it is hard to see proactive
investigations affecting anything but the most high profile actors. The
UK Information Commissioner has noted that her office has a history of
taking forward complaints even where there is no data subject mandating
them, in relation to national debate around whether the UK makes a der-
ogation to incorporate Art 80(2), but even this remains very different
from solo investigation. See Information Commissioner’s Office,
The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) response to DCMS
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) derogations call for views.
(ICO 2017) para 113.
120 Art 36, GDPR.
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emerge that go unscrutinized as a result. Scrutinizing
the effectiveness of technical privacy strategies is impor-
tant to ensure that trade-offs made, implicitly or explic-
itly, deliberately or not, are compatible with both
overarching data protection principles and Article 8 of
the Charter. If the form of DPbD is itself shrouded in
secrecy, it seems difficult to believe that meaningful
oversight is possible.
We urge DPAs and other relevant actors to update
their guidance to ensure that ex ante transparency rights
are enforced to include specific information as to where
and why data subjects can expect to lose their rights to
DPbD trade-offs. While it is clear in the GDPR that
data subjects are entitled to this information ex post,
when an attempt to use a right such as access, erasure or
objection has been refused, we have argued that the
Article 13–14 ex ante information rights may be more
powerful than considered in this domain. Not one but
two sources of the GDPR can be drawn upon to support
this claim—notification of the existence of rights
(Articles 13(2)(b)/14(2)(c)), and meaningful informa-
tion about significant solely automated decisions and
measures (Articles 13(2)(f)/14(2)(g)), both of which to
differing degrees appear to oblige data controllers to lay
out beforehand which rights and obligations are not be-
ing provided, and why.
We urge technical communities, civil society and reg-
ulators to support the development of re-identification
technologies in order to enable data subjects to be lo-
cated in partly de-identified datasets so they can better
manage their own risks. Re-identification tools are con-
stantly developed by both academic researchers as well
as more nefarious actors, yet the codebases for these
tools are often too scrappy for easy use by controllers
intending to be legally compliant. We argue that making
tools to enable rights available will increase data subject
agency (by increasing the number of ‘state-of-the-art’
technologies that are ‘available’ to controllers) more
than it will meaningfully increase the capabilities of ad-
versaries, who, as adept users of scrappy code, are core
beneficiaries of the current imbalance.
We also urge the technical community developing
PETs to consider, in addition to their current research,
how to get more out of the current trade-offs between
control and confidentiality in the solutions they
engineer. These trade-offs are only likely to get more
common, in particular with the growth in technologies
such as secure classification and multi-party computa-
tion,121 which are likely to tie controllers’ hands in new
and interesting ways, or even call our current under-
standing of a ‘controller’ and their competencies into
question. In calling for this greater examination, we are
not seeking to echo Australian Prime Minister Malcolm
Turnbull’s much-mocked recent proclamation that
whilst the ‘laws of mathematics are very commendable
[. . .] the only law that applies in Australia is the law of
Australia’.122 But such practical difficulties data control-
lers face in trying to accommodate data subject rights
do form part of a broader disconnect between technical
and legal definitions/interpretations of key data protec-
tion notions. Indeed, a 2012 Enisa Report highlighted a
mismatch between the right to erasure in the law and in
practice.123 There may well be times where legal require-
ments are technically or mathematically intractable, but
without interdisciplinary research and funding chal-
lenges to understand the true limits of attempts to max-
imize these trade-offs, we will not know. While not all
PETs research should focus in this way, and there is a
lot to be gained from even deeper research into how to
reduce information disclosure further in more complex
application areas, the lack of research into this area is
stark and sorely in need of rectification.
In other cases, such as the WiFi analytics described
above, the issue may be both technical and due to a lack
of coordination in the use of privacy-enhancing tools in
an untrusted environment. Forcing users to make their
own devices difficult to track, such as through MAC
randomization, serves to chastise them for sensible pre-
caution by stripping them of their rights to manage data
that is still risky and fraught with re-identification
potential. Recent legislative moves, such as those in
the proposed ePrivacy Regulation to make Do Not
Track signals from browsers and devices legally bind-
ing124 have some promise in this area, but depending
on an individual’s threat model, may be of little use.
An individual may trust established data controllers,
but be using privacy enhancing technologies, such as
MAC address randomization, to prevent ‘cowboys’
with little regard for data protection law scraping their
passively emitted data. This type of problem appears
121 See eg Raphael Bost and others, ‘Machine Learning Classification over
Encrypted Data’, Proceedings 2015 Network and Distributed System
Security Symposium (Internet Society 2015).
122 Chris Duckett and Asha McLean, ‘The Laws of Australia Will Trump the
Laws of Mathematics: Turnbull’ ZDNet (14 July 2017) <http://www.
zdnet.com/article/the-laws-of-australia-will-trump-the-laws-of-mathe
matics-turnbull/> accessed 12 November 2017.
123 See Peter Druschel, Michael Backes, and Rodica Tirtea, The Right to Be
Forgotten – between Expectations and Practice (ENISA, November 2012),
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/identity-and-trust/library/deliver
ables/the-right-to-be-forgotten/ (surrounding difficulties in identifying
and locating specific sets of data, corruption of databases, endangering
the integrity of backups—and in the extreme, the cost and difficulties
surrounding physically destroying the storage device).
124 Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (n 51).
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to be difficult to solve, and likely deserves more legal,
social, and technical examination than it has currently
been afforded.
Emerging problems with characteristics such as those
we are describing would likely benefit from broad inter-
disciplinary engagement, including Human-Computer
Interaction (HCI) and Responsible Research and
Innovation (RRI) which have significant experience in
this field. Like all fields filled with trade-offs, they can-
not be ‘solved’—but we are confident that they can be
better navigated and managed. Data protection law can
surely help with the first step—acknowledging, both in-
ternally and externally, that these trade-offs exist.
Making ‘better’ trade-offs promises to be considerably
harder, but surely an important task for those spanning
roles, disciplines and sectors in the years to come.
doi:10.1093/idpl/ipy002
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